prevail, but the path is excessively tortuous, and often even torturous to those who are primarily involved.
Early in I98I a joint ad hoc committee on biomedical ethics of the Los Angeles County Medical Association (LACMA) and the Los Angeles County Bar Association (LACBA) developed, after six months' deliberation, a set of Guidelines for Discontinuance of Cardiopumonary Life-support Systems under Specified Circwnstances. They were adopted both by the council of LACMA and by the LACBA board of trustees, and were published in LACMA Physician on May 4, I98I . The Deputy District Attorney (DDA) then in charge of the medical-legal section of the District Attorney's (DA's) office had served on the joint committee. He said 'It is my opinion that a physician who follows the Guidelines is practising well within community standards and should therefore have no fear of any type of criminal prosecution'. However, it is not he, but his successor as head of the medical-legal section of the DA's office who will prosecute Drs Neil Leonard Barber and Robert Joseph Nejdl on a charge that they 'did wilfully and unlawfully and with malice aforethought, murder Clarence Leroy Herbert, a human being'. The former DDA is now a lawyer in private practice, and has been retained by the defence as one of their legal counsel.
The published Guidelines refer repeatedly to lifesupport systems in the plural, but mention only one in particular, namely the mechanical respirator or ventilator. They do not use the language of 'ordinary vs extraordinary means', nor do they attempt to define what constitutes normal, usual, customary or routine medical or nursing care under different sets of circumstances. One of the general principles listed is that 'the dignity of the individual must be preserved and necessary measures to assure comfort be maintained at all times'. Three sets of circumstances are listed 'in which decisions to discontinue the -use of cardiopulmonary life-support systems can be made without the necessity of prior approval by the courts'. These are i) Brain Death, when certified according to California Law, ie, 'total and irreversible cessation of brain function' -which is taken by most doctors to include, by inference, total cessation of brain-stem function; 2) California Natural Death Act, where a patient has previously signed a valid and binding 'Directive to Phys-icians' (i); and 3) Irreversible Coma. The Guidelines expressly state in a footnote that whereas the first two sets of circumstances 'are based on provisions of the California Health and Safety Code, this paragraph dealing with irreversible coma is not based on any California statute or court decision, but rather reflects our view of good medical practice and the current standard of medical care in Los Angeles County.' The case under review (if and when it comes to trial and judgment) will test the legal validity or wisdom of this section of the Guidelines. What is so distressing is that the trauma inevitably suffered in a California murder trial should have to be inflicted on so many people in order to test the validity of this third category, which states under Irreversible Coma:
'Cardiopulmonary life-support systems may be discontinued ifall ofthe following conditions are present:
a. The medical record contains a written diagnosis of irreversible coma, confirmed by a physician who by training or experience is qualified to assist in making such decisions. The medical record must include adequate medical evidence to support the diagnosis;
b. The medical record indicates that there has been no expressed intention on the part of the patient that life-support systems be initiated or maintained in such circumstances; and c. The medical record indicates that the patient's family, or guardian or conservator, concurs in the decision to discontinue such support.
The comfort and dignity ofthe patient shall be maintained if death does not occur on discontinuation of cardiopulmonary life-support systems.'
A Grand Jury hearing involves the giving of preliminary testimony to determine whether an indictment should be brought. The DA often uses it to obtain additional evidence. Six physicians from the hospital concerned (including one of those now charged) were subpoenaed. All six invoked the Fifth Amendment on legal counsel's advice, and refused to testify or to be questioned by the DDA. This generated more negative publicity, and for the first time a newspaper article on June 9 hinted at possible grounds for the 'malice aforethought' that the subsequent criminal charge would ultimately allege. Mr Herbert's treatment and death occurred in a hospital belonging to the KaiserPermanente system. This is the nation's largest prepaid health care system or 'health maintenance organisation' (HMO). Subscribers pay fixed monthly rates and are then entitled, at nominal additional cost, to total care at any of the system's hospitals -or elsewhere, by arrangement, if location or special needs necessitates the services of another hospital or other physicians. The system is rather like the National Health Service in Britain. Increasingly it is being regarded as a possible model for national health insurance, if that ever comes about in the United States (2 TV and press. It would have been possible to apply for a court restraining order on further publicity while the case is sub judice. This, however, is a two-edged sword in a society where 'freedom of the press' and 'the right to know' are slogans that suggest that ifyou aren't prepared to 'let it all hang out' you must be hiding something that is either illegal or shameful. When a prosecutor has acted so zealously in the media in pursuit ofhis goals, at a time more than three months before even a preliminary court hearing (set for December 3), it is not surprising that the accused should want to make some kind of rejoinder. So eventually, in September, we saw and heard from Drs Barber and Nejdl, quietly stating that they had indeed followed the Guidelines approved last year, and that they were motivated throughout by compassionate concern for the late Mr Herbert and for members ofhis family.
It Why should it be thought to be different just because it is so easy to set up an intravenous drip rather than use the more difficult, but more natural, gastro-intestinal route? The routine use of IV drips has brought many benefits. But it also carries inconveniences and risks to the patient, all ofwhich should be measured against the convenience to the staff of having a ready route of access for the administration of whatever it is thought good to instill into the patient's body. Perhaps in some circumstances the only major benefit afforded by the IV drip is to the medical and nursing staff, since it gives them the emotional satisfaction and comfort of thinking that at least something is being done.
The presence of an IV demands careful attention to fluid input and output, and daily or more frequent analysis of blood chemistry to check the effects on the body's homeostatic mechanisms. These measures can sometimes go very wrong in the terminal stages. Or they can go apparently 'right', although the patient dies: we are familiar with the pleased but slightly puzzled look of the resident who announces that the blood electrolytes were in balance just so many hours or minutes before death! If the patient had been dying in irreversible coma, for whose benefit and in whose interest were all those tests, all that activity performed?
When things go wrong with IV fluids they can be disastrous. My old colleague in Pathology in Cambridge (the 'University Morbid Anatomist', as he is officially titled) used to make a point ofdemonstrating, at autopsy, the extent and degree to which 'waterlogging' of the corpse's tissues had sometimes occurred. 'You drowned this patient', he would declare to the assembled clinicians. On the wall of that autopsy room was a saying attributed to Napoleon, 'I do not want to have two diseases, one nature-made and one doctor-made'. Sometimes it is better to leave things to nature, especially when a patient is dying.
When this case comes to trial -it still might not, of course, but it would be a bold and maybe foolish judge who would, at this stage and in view ofthe considerable public interest, refuse permission for the prosecution to proceed -it may be that what will really be tried are, first the published Guidelines for the withdrawal of life-support systems, and second the practice of routine administration of intravenous fluids. If withdrawal of IV fluids from a deeply comatose patient is considered equivalent to denying food and water to a conscious patient and thereby 'starving him to death' (as some of the media stories in this instance have suggested) then we might as well be with Alice in Wonderland, playing crazy croquet with the red queen.
*The reader should know and bear in mind that onJune30 the writer was asked by the hospital's attorneys to review and report on the patient's chart. He may be called to testify for the defence at the trial.
